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Calling All Denizens Resource Book


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Calling all denizens,

To those who refuse the dichotomy of citizen and alien; to those who carry traditions of exile, the weight of survival, the audacity to still be tender; to those who wish to lay claim to their own boundaries of belonging; to those who embrace wandering from within and without diaspora; to those who embrace groundlessness, multiplicity, fluidity, and change; to those who love what is not meant to be loved; to those for whom the entire world is a foreign land; to those

who emerge in intersections, in-between categories of place and personhood; to those whose very being is an act of dissent and discord; to those who refuse the ideal of assimilation and embrace a politics of difference; to those for whom *poetry* is not a luxury; to those who refuse nation-thinking; to those who seek to liberate the boundaries placed on our capacity to act up and speak out; to those for whom the *horizon leans forward;*

How does your denizenship take form?

What if all Citizens were Denizens?

What does it mean to be an American citizen? One of the biggest threats to social, political, and cultural progress in the United States today is an already narrow and narrowing concept of what it means to be a citizen. This is one of the threats our society grapples with as deep institutional misconduct and human rights violations against immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees, and others continue to thrive in both practice and law. What are the ideologies and practices that prepared the ground for policies that permanently separate children from their families; that deny asylum and refuge from those facing deadly violence; that imprison people on account of their place of birth; that ban thousands from entering the United States based on the religion they practice or represent? By compiling a collection of court rulings and laws that surround the history of immigration and naturalization policy in the United States, this resource book attempts to illustrate the relationship between white supremacy, white American identity, and the historically constructed notion of the American citizen.

In a recent collaborative project, Sentiments: Expressions of Cultural Passage published by Press Press,¹ I relied on the materials compiled in the pages ahead to frame a compilation of conversations, essays, and artist projects that illustrate nuanced first-person accounts of various experiences and identities that immigrants carry. In the introduction of Sentiments, I share this brief history.

Starting with the first Immigration Act of 1790, the privilege of citizenship was limited to "free white aliens."² This language aimed to transform northern and western

European immigrants into American citizens and exclude anyone else. At the time it was first written into law, this language specifically excluded Black and Indigenous People from citizenship. This jargon was not taken out of immigration law until 1952, when race was no longer formally named as a qualifier for obtaining citizenship. However, it was not until 1965 that racist policies that limited the number of legally permitted immigrants who originated outside of northern and western Europe were actually revoked with the passing of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. This law was passed largely due to the momentum of the Civil Rights Movement that made white supremacy increasingly unacceptable in the social and legal spheres.³ Although it was written into law, the term "free white alien" had come into legal use before the Supreme Court had fully, legally defined the category of "white person." As new waves of immigrants came into the United States, various individuals across different time periods over the last 200 years who sought citizenship rights were strategically rejected on the basis of the racial prerequisite. Through this process, the legal category of "white person" was refined and shifted.⁴ For example, in a famous Supreme Court case, United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind in 1923, Thind, an Indian immigrant, argued that he and American whites were both of Caucasian descent, and he was thus qualified to attain citizenship. In order to reject Thind's argument, the court decided to disregard its "scientific" understanding of what determines a "white person"-i.e. previously, the word "Caucasian" had been used to determine white status based on an individual's ancestry⁵—and used a new definition of whiteness "to be interpreted in accordance with the understanding of the common man."⁶ This shift not only explicitly shows that the production of laws in the United States is based on a social ideological notion of race, but also exemplifies the ways the legal system has fluctuated in order to maintain the ideology of whiteness. Instead of building up a deep cultural meaning around the idea of citizenship—as in trying to clarify what it means to be an accountable member of the public sphere, a neighbor, a resident, or a community member-the value of American citizenship was largely created through lines of race-based exclusion.⁷

This history is invoked constantly in today's popular rhetoric around immigration. In a country that is relatively new, where most white Americans are at most three or four generations removed from the experience of immigration, the notion of the "immigrant" today is often used as a substitute for the racialized Other; for those who are deemed undeserving of human rights. This ideology that perpetuates white supremacy through the notion of citizenship is predicated on stolen land, where the only rightful inhabitants are those indigenous peoples from whom it was stolen.

In response to this history of race-based exclusion to citizenship and processes of identity-erasing assimilation in the United States, *Calling All Denizens* aims to give rise to a more compassionate, ethical, and genuine vision of a liberated society. *Calling All Denizens* is a participatory research project that facilitates conversations, workshops, and programs that aim to cooperatively imagine the new political practice of denizenship as an alternative to the notion of citizenship. "Denizen," derived from Latin *deintus*, literally means "from within", but has historically been used in reference to foreign residents who are granted limited rights in the states in which they reside. Building on this historical meaning, *Calling All Denizens* partners with individuals and organizations to explore the notions of "from within" and "from without" as they pertain to the nuances of citizenship, sovereignty, migration, exile, and diaspora.

The project takes multiple fluid forms, from public displays of its Manifesto, to an archive of conversations on citizenship, distributed newspapers, and a series of participatory workshops that may be reproduced in libraries and other educational spaces. This resource book serves as a foundation for the broader project: it compiles and shares research I collected, which is largely based on White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race by Ian Haney Lopez. A major component of this resource book is a collection of brief summaries of the racial prerequisite naturalization court cases that took place during the years citizenship was limited to "free white aliens." These cases document the often inconsistent and contradictory attempts to ground racial categories in law. As lan Haney Lopez explains, "Applicants from Hawaii, China, Japan, Burma, and the Philippines, as well as all mixed race applicants, failed in their arguments. Conversely, courts ruled that applicants from Mexico and Armenia were "white," but vacillated over the Whiteness of petitioners from Syria, India, and Arabia. Seen as a taxonomy of Whiteness, these cases are instructive because they reveal the

imprecisions and contradictions inherent in the establishment of racial lines between Whites and non-Whites."⁸

Calling All Denizens and Sentiments: Expressions of Cultural Passage can be read congruently: while Sentiments adds nuance and complexity to the often over-simplified identity of the "immigrant," *Calling All Denizens* aims to complicate and re-imagine the all-toooften unexamined identity of the "American citizen." The materials gathered into this publication serve as a transparent invitation to join in this ongoing process: What if all citizens were denizens?

2 Between 1790 and 1802, people applying for naturalization were required to have resided in the country for five years, have "good moral character," and be "free white persons." This language was meant to exclude Black residents and "Indians not taxed" from citizenship rights. Generally, these laws aimed to transform northern and western European immigrants into American citizens and exclude anyone else. However, the Fourteenth Amendment declared that all free persons born in the United States should be considered citizens. In 1870, Congress amended naturalization requirements and extended eligibility to "aliens being free white persons, and to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent." This revision led to further confusion over racial eligibility for citizenship. In 1882, Congress banned the naturalization of Chinese immigrants with The Chinese Exclusion Act, however it did not explain whether "Chinese" indicated race or nationality.

3 How the civil rights movement opened the door to immigrants of color by Rebekah Barber, Facing South, 2017.

4 White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race by Ian Haney Lopez, 1996.

5 Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 1922.

6 United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 1923.

7 Race, Nationality, and Reality by Marian L. Smith, 2002.

8 White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race by Ian Haney Lopez, 1996.

¹ Press Press is a publishing initiative that aims to shift and deepen the understanding of voices identities and narratives that have been suppressed or misrepresented by the mainstream. Press Press was founded by Kimi Hanauer in 2014 and is produced in collaboration with Valentina Cabezas, Bomin Jeon, and Bilphena Yahwon.

Court Case Summaries

The following pages feature the original language in the case summaries of three significant racial prerequisite court cases: *Takao Ozawa v. United States, Bhagat Singh Thind v. United States,* and *Cartozian v. United States.* These cases, all of which took place in the early 1920's, illustrate how the notion of a "white person" was discussed and interpreted within the legal field.

What do these defendants' arguments reveal about the construction of whiteness in the legal field? Defendants make layered arguments, often centering on several key character traits they hold for why they should be considered "white persons." These include speaking English, having an American education, being able to successfully assimilate and amalgamate [meaning, having children with "white persons"], being Christian, upholding hetero-normative family values, and being descendent of a group of people who held power over others in their place of origin. The courts typically justified their decisions based on the following set of rationales:


Common Knowledge: The "common sense" of the "common man" was often used as a way to determine if a person was "white."

Scientific Evidence: A person could also be considered "white" as it was understood in accordance with the term "Caucasian," which was used to identify persons who share a common ancestral origin.


Legal Precedent: In common law legal systems, a precedent or authority is a legal case that establishes a principle or rule.

Constitutional Intent: The immigration Act of 1790 states that any "free white alien" of "good moral character" may be naturalized. Constitutional Intent refers back to this Act, to question who was meant to be included or excluded from citizenship. What was the original intent of this phrase?









000		p under the naturalization laws?	limited to aliens being free white persons and to ese race, born in Japan, under any circumstances	* Congression	1 by the provisions of section 2169 of the Revised		inding 'Naturalization,' and reads as follows:	und to aliens of African nativity and to persons of	t and Naturalization, and to provide for a uniform it sections and deals primarily with the subject of ng the passage of the act which suggests that any	commending its passage, contains this statement	been committed in regard to naturalization have than from any radical defect in the fundamental accommittee has recommended in the principles nitted herewith are as follows: First, the require-	5ab	
2] The District Court of Hawaii, however, held that, having been born in Japan and being of the Japanese race, he was not eligible to naturalization under section 2169 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. St. § 4358), and denied the petition. Thereupon the appellant brought the cause to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and that court has certified the following questions, upon which it desires to be instructed:	3] 'i. Is the act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stats. at Large, pt. 1, p. 596), providing 'for a uniform rule for the naturalization of aliens' com- plete in itself, or is it limited by section 2169 of the Revised Statutes of the United States?	4 '2. Is one who is of the Japanese mce and born in Japan eligible to citizenship under the naturalization laws?	5 '3. If said act of June 29, 1906, is limited by section 2169 and naturalization is limited to aliens being free white persons and to aliens of <u>African nativity</u> and to persons of African descent, is one of the Japanese race, born in Ja <u>pan, under any circum</u> stances eligible to naturalization?	6 These questions for purposes of discussion may be briefly restated:	γ 1. Is the Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906 (Comp. St. § 4351 et seq.), limited by the provisions of section 2169 of the Revised Statutes of the United States?	8] 2. If so limited, is the appellant eligible to naturalization under that section?	9 First. Section 2169 is found in title XXX of the Revised Statutes, under the heading 'Naturalization,' and reads as follows:	to! The provisions of this title shall apply to aliens, being free white persons and to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.	II] The act of June 29, 1906, entitled 'An act to establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, and to provide for a uniform rule for the naturalization of aliens throughout the United States,' consists of 31 sections and deals primarily with the subject of procedure. There is nothing in the circumstances leading up to or accompanying the passage of the act which suggests that any modification of section 2169, or of its application, was contemplated.	12 The report of the House Committee on Naturalization and Immigration, recommending its passage, contains this statement	13] 'It is the opinion of your committee that the frauds and crimes which have been committed in regard to naturalization have resulted more from a lack of any uniform system of procedure in such matters than from any radical defect in the fundamental principles of existing law governing in such matters. The two changes which the committee has recommended in the principles controlling in naturalization matters and which are embodied in the bill submitted herewith are as follows: First, the require-	Who did the framers mean to include + exclude? Whiteness = interent · freedom, English + education, christianity. English	Caucasion = Flexible zone

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4	ment that before an alien can be naturalized he must be able to read, either in his own language or in the English language and to speak or understand the English language; and, second, that the alien must intend to reside permanently in the United States before he shall be entitled to naturalization. ¹ 14 This seems to make it quite clear that no change of the fundamental character here involved was in mind.
	Js Section 26 of the Act (Comp. St. § 4381) expressly repeals sections 2165, 2167, 2168, 2173 of title XXX, the subject-matter thereof being covered by new provisions. The sections of title XXX remaining without repeal are: Section 2166, relating to honorably discharged soldiers; section 2169 (Comp. St. § 4358), now under consideration; section 2170 (section 4360), requiring five years' residence prior to admission; section 2171 (section 4352[11]), forbidding the admission of alien enemies; section 2172 (section 4367), relating to the status of children of naturalized persons; and section 2174 (section 4352[8]), making special provision in respect of the naturalization of seamen. There is nothing in section 2174 (section 4352[8]), making special provision in respect of the naturalization of seamen. There is nothing in section 2169 which is repugnant to anything in the act of 1906. Both may stand and be given effect. It is clear, therefore, that there is no repeal by implication.
	16 But it is insisted by appellant that section 2169, by its terms is made applicable only to the provisions of title XXX, and that it will not admit of being construed as a restriction upon the act of 1906. Since section 2169, it is in effect argued, declares that 'the provisions of this title shall apply to aliens being free white persons, ••• 't should be confined to the classes provided for in the unrepealed sections of that title, leaving the act of 1906 to govern in respect of all other aliens, without any restriction except such as may be imposed by that act itself.
	ωοω 17] It is contended that, thus construed, the act of 1906 confers the privilege of naturalization without limitation as to race, since the general introductory words of section 4 (Comp. St. § 4322) are:
4	18 "That an alien may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States in the following manner, and not otherwise."
eksibility"	19 But, obviously, this clause does not relate to the subject of <u>eligibility</u> but to the <u>manner</u> that is, the procedure, to be followed. Exactly the same words are used to introduce the similar provisions contained in section 2165 of the Revised Statutes, In 1790 the first naturalization act provided that ——
manner	20 'Any alien being a free white person *** may be admitted to become a citizen. *** 1 Stat. 103, c. 3.
ź	21 This was subsequently enlarged to include aliens of African nativity and persons of African descent. These provisions were restated in the Revised Statutes, so that section 2165 included only the procedural portion, while the substantive parts were carried into a separate section (2169) and the words 'An alien' substituted for the words 'Any alien.'
no racial isi. 423.	
×	vessel, both of whom were entitled from the beginning to admission on more generous terms than were accorded to other aliens. It is not conceivable that Converse would defiberately have allowed the edit function.

seamen to whom the statute had accorded an especially favored status, and have removed it as to all other aliens. Such a construction cannot be adopted unless it be unavoidable.

by the limitation of section 2169, originally embraced the whole subject of naturalization of aliens. The generality of the words in section 2165, An alien may be admitted, **** was restricted by section 2169 in common with the other provisions of the title. The words 'this title' were used for the purpose of identifying that provision (and others), but it was the provision which was restricted. That provision having been amended and carried into the act of 1906, section 2169 being left intact and unrepealed, it 24| The division of the Revised Statutes into titles and chapters is chiefly a matter of convenience, and reference to a given title or chapter is simply a ready method of identifying the particular provisions which are meant. The provisions of title XXX affected will require some thing more persuasive than a narrowly literal reading of the identifying words 'this title' to justify the conclusion that Congress intended the restriction to be no longer applicable to the provision.

natural significance, but if this leads to an unreasonable result plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole, we must examine the matter further. We may then look to the reason of the enactment and inquire into its antecedent history dation of any committee, without a suggestion as to the effect, or a word of debate as to the desirability, of so fundamental a change, nevertheless, by failing to alter the identifying words of section 2169, which section we may assume was continued for some serious purpose, has radically modified a statute always theretofore maintained and considered as of great importance. It is inconceivable that a rule in force from the beginning of the government, a part of our history as well as our law, welded into the structure of our national polity by a century of legislative and administrative acts and judicial decisions, would have been 35| It is the duty of this Court to give effect to the intent of Congress. Primarily this intent is ascertained by giving the words their and give it effect in accordance with its design and purpose, sacrificing, if necessary, the literal meaning in order that the purpose may not fail. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 12 Sup. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226; Heydenfeldt v. Daney deprived of its force in such dubious and casual fashion. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the act of 1906 is limited by Gold, etc., Co., 93 U. S. 634, 638, 23 L. Ed. 995. We are asked to conclude that Congress, without the consideration or recommenthe provisions of section 2169 of the Revised Statutes.


> * Congressional Intent 1

26| Second. This brings us to inquire whether, under section 2169, the appellant is eligible to naturalization. The language of he came within the description 'free white person.' By section 7 of the act of July 14, 1870 (16 Stat. 254, 256 [Comp. St. § 4358]), the the naturalization laws from 1790 to 1870 had been uniformly such as to deny the privilege of naturalization to an alien unless naturalization laws were 'extended to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.' Section 2169 of the Revised Statutes, as already pointed out, restricts the privilege to the same classes of persons, viz. 'to aliens [being free white persons, and to aliens] of African nativity and to persons of African descent.' It is true that in the first edition of the Revised Statutes of 1873 the words in brackets, 'being free white persons, and to aliens' were omitted, but this was clearly an error of the compilers and was corrected by the subsequent legislation of 1875 (18 Stat. 316, 318). Is appellant, therefore, a 'free white person,' within the meaning of that phrase as found in the statute?

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
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165 Red, 923: In re Yamashira, 30 Wash 34, 337, 70 Pac. 483, 94 Am. St. Rep. 860; In re Ellis (D. C.) 779 Fed. 1002; In re Mozumdar 165 C. 3 277 Fed. 309, 211, 212; and In re Charr (D. C.) 273 Fed. 207, With the conclusion reached (D. C.) 377 Fed. 309, 211, 212; and In re Charr (D. C.) 273 Fed. 207, With the conclusion reached (D. C.) 297 Fed. 309, 211, 212; and In re Charr (D. C.) 273 Fed. 207, With the conclusion reached (D. C.) 297 Fed. 309, 211, 212; and In re Charr (D. C.) 273 Fed. 207, With the conclusion reached (D. C.) 297 Fed. 309, 211, 212; and In reclustion thas become so well established by judicial and concurrence and legislative acquiescence that we should not at this late day feel at liberty to disturb it, in the absence of reasons far more cogent than any that have been suggested. United States v. Midwest Oil C.o, 296 U. S. 459, 472, 55 Sup. CL. 309, 59 L. Ed. 673.	$\circ_{OLEARLY}$ ELIGABLE 34 The briefs filed on behalf of appellant refer in complimentary terms to the culture and enlightenment of the Japanese peo- $\circ_{OLEARLY}$ ELIGABLE 916, and with this estimate we have no function in the matter other than to ascertain the will of Congress and declare it. Of course questions here at issue. We have no function in the matter other than to ascertain the will of Congress and declare it. Of course there is not implied—either in the legislation or in our interpretation of it—any suggestion of individual unworthiness or racial inferiority. These considerations are in no manner involved. $\rightarrow C$ ($COLFICA$) a Clear for Ci al historicly 33] The questions submitted are therefore answered as follows: and plainly Saying it is not		38 Question No. 3. No. 39 It will be so certified. United States Supreme Court	
(63 Fed. 922; In re Yau (63 Fed. 922; In re Yau (D. C.) 207 Fed. 115, 11 in these several decii executive concurrent of reasons far more c 59 L. Ed. 673. 32] The determinatio the problem, althou the proper classifica is not to 6 undization, but rath and outside of which must be determined leans, 96 U. S. 97, 104 leans, 96 U. S. 97, 104 leans, 96 U. S. 97, 104 leans, 96 U. S. 97, 104 determ it necessary to determ it necessary to determ it necessary to	 34 The briefs filed of ple, and with this est questions here at its there is not implied inferiority. These co 35 The questions st 	36 Question No. 1. The United States. 37 Question No. 2. No.	38 Question No. 3. No. 39 It will be so certifie	
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ree white persons and to aliens of affican nativity and to persons of African descent.

Previouse

its privileges'-citing Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 644. Following a long line of decisions of the lower Federal particular [26t U.S. 204, 208] races been suggested the language of the act would have been so varied as to include them within courts, we held that the words imported a racial and not an individual test and were meant to indicate only persons of what is of these words to the case of a cultivated Japanese and were constrained to hold that he was not within their meaning. As there Caucasian' are synonymous does not end the matter. It enabled us to dispose of the problem as it was there presented, since the applicant for citizenship clearly fell outside the zone of debatable ground on the negative side; but the decision still left the v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 43 Sup. Ct. 65, 67 L. Ed. --, decided November 13, 1922, we had occasion to consider the application pointed out, the provision is not that any particular class of persons shall be excluded, but it is, in effect, that only white persons shall be included within the privilege of the statute. 'The intention was to confer the privilege of citizenship upon that class of persons whom the fathers knew as white, and to deny it to all who could not be so classified. It is not enough to say that the framers did not have in mind the brown or yellow races of Asia. It is necessary to go farther and be able to say that had these popularly known as the Caucasian race. But, as there pointed out, the conclusion that the phrase 'white persons' and the word question to be dealt with, in doubtful and different cases, by the 'process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.' Mere ability on the part of an applicant for naturalization to establish a line of descent from a Caucasian ancestor will not ipso facto to and neces-If the applicant is a white person, within the meaning of this section, he is entitled to naturalization; otherwise not. In Ozawa sarily conclude the inquiry. 'Caucasian' is a conventional word of much flexibility, as a study of the literature dealing with racial questions will disclose, and while it and the words 'white persons' are treated as synonymous for the purposes of that case, the are not of identical meaning-idem per idem. COMYMON SPE CCH *

FLEXIBLE

casian,' but the words <u>white persons</u>,' and these are words of common speech and not of scientific origin. The word 'Caucasian,' not .means clear, and the use of it in its scientific probably wholly unfamiliar to the original framers of the statute in 1790. When ry words. Indeed, as used in the science of ethnology, the connotation of the word is by no means clear, and the use of it in its scientific sense as an equivalent [261 U.S. 204, 209] for the words of the statute, other considerations aside, would simply mean usage has acquired a popular meaning, not clearly defined to be sure, but sufficiently so to enable us to say that its popular as that we employ is as an aid to the construction of the statute, for it would be obviously illogical to convert words of common the statute are to be interpreted in accordance with the understanding of the common man from whose vocabulary they were In the endeavor to ascertain the meaning of the statute we must not fail to keep in mind that it does not employ the word 'Cauwe employ it, we do so as an aid to the ascertainment of the legislative intent and not as an invariable substitute for the statutothe substitution of one perplexity for another. But in this country, during the last half century especially, the word by common distinguished from its scientific application is of appreciably narrower scope. It is in the popular sense of the word, therefore, speech used in a statute into words of scientific terminology when neither the latter nor the science for whose purposes they were coined was within the contemplation of the framers of the statute or of the people for whom it was framed. The words of taken. See Maillard v. Lawrence, 16 How. 251, 261.

BE INTERPRETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING to

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es of the statute, must be proups of persons who are y both resemble him to a ' the knows perfectly well that ava rage noth of his descendants to out, therefore, whether by d that they have the same diffic men-in classifying thy the same to justify the ientific men-in classifying face of common arcestry, without ommon ancestry, without ommon ancestry, without of from one another.	stock born in Punjah one Caucasian or Ayan race FIC ubject of ethnology. A re- Races of Man, 317). Keane es, Senate Document 662, AVE RAGE em reasonably clear that i altogether inadequate to ran language was not spo- nof the English tongue by persons, notwithstanding	fortuitous origin, 2 which rding to Keane, for exam- is 3 (that is, the Maori, Ta- of their features, though nerican would learn with elements. 4 [261 U.S. 204, <u>Wision.</u> For instance, Blu- e inumerable varieties of ions is an undertaking of
They imply, as we have said, a racial test, but the term 'race' is one which, for the practical purposes of the statute, must be applied to a group of living persons now possessing in common the requisite characteristics, not to groups of persons who are supposed to be or really are descended from some remote, common ancestor, but who, whether they both resemble him to a 't + We strater or less extem, have, at any rate, cassed allogether to resemble one another. It may be true that they both resemble him to a 't + We are the brown Hindu have a common ancestor in the dim reaches of antiquity, but the average man knows perfectly well that there are unmistaleable and profound differences between them to day, and it is not impossible, if that common ancestor could be materialized in the flesh, we should discover that he was himself sufficiently differentiated from both of his descendants to there are unmistaleable and profound differences between them to-day, and it is not impossible, if that common ancestor could be materialized in the flesh, we should discover that he was himself sufficiently differentiated from both of his descendants to preclude his racial classification with either. The question for determination [267 US. 204, 210] is not, therefore, whether by the speculative processes of ethnological reasoning we may present a probability to the scientific men-in classification whether we can satisfy the common understanding that they are now the same or sufficiently the same to justify the interpreters of a statute written in the words of common speech. for common understanding, by are now the same or sufficiently the same to justify the interpreters of a statute written in the words while persons. To the mere test of an indefinitely remote common ancestry, without the question of the subsequent divergence of the various branches from noth endors, wither the statute or the words while persons to the m	The eligibility of this applicant for citizenship is based on the sole fact that he is of high-caste Hindu stock, born in Punjah, one of the extreme northwestern districts of India, and classified by certain scientific <u>authorities as of the Caucasian or Ayan race</u> . The Aryan theory as a racial basis seems to be discredited by most, if not all, modern writers on the subject of ethnology. A review of their contentions would serve no useful purpose. It is enough to refer to the works of Deniker (Races of Man, 317), Keane (Man, Past and Present, 445, 446), and Huxley (Man's Place in Nature, 278) and to the Dictionary of Races, Senate Document 662, 613 (Congress, 3d Sess. 1910-1911, p. 17. LANGUAGE (Man, Past and Present, 445, 446), and Huxley (Man's Place in Nature, 278) and to the Dictionary of Races, Senate Document 662, 613 (Congress, 3d Sess. 1910-1911, p. 17. LANGUAGE (Man's Place in Nature, 278) and to the Dictionary of Races, Senate Document 662, 614 (Man's Place in Nature, 778) and to the Dictionary of Races, Senate Document 662, 614 (Man's Place in Nature, 778) and to the Dictionary of Races, Senate Document 662, 614 (Man's Place in Nature, 778) and to the Dictionary of Races, Senate Document 662, 614 (Man's Place), and Huxley (Man's Place in Nature, 778) and to the Dictionary of Races, Senate Document 662, 614 (Man's Place), and the the so-called [261US. 204, 211] Aryan language was not spore prove common racial origin. There is, and can be, no assurance that the so-called [261US. 204, 211] Aryan language was not spore prove common racial origin. There is, and can be, no searance that the so-called [261US. 204, 211] Aryan language was not spore prove common racial origin. There is, and can be, no assurance that the so-called [261US. 204, 211] Aryan language was not spore prove common racial origin. There is, and can be no assurance that the so-called [261US. 204, 211] Aryan language was not spore prove to the row of the graves, whose descendants con nevery be classified racially with the descendants of	The word 'Caucasian' is in scarcely better repute. I It is at best a conventional term, with an altogether fortuitous origin, 2 which under scientific manipulation, has come to include far more than the unscientific mind suspects. According to Keane, for exam- ple (The World's Peoples, 24, 28, 307, et seq.), it includes not only the Hindu, but some of the Polynesians 3 (that is, the Maori, Ta- hitians, Samoans, Hawaiians, and others), the Hamites of Africa, upon the ground of the Caucasic cast of their features, though in color they range from brown to black. We venture to think that the average well-informed white American would learn with some degree of astonishment that the race to which he belongs is made up of such heterogeneous elements. 4 [261 U.S. 204, 212] The various authorities are in irreconcilable disagreement as to what constitutes a <u>proper racial division</u> . For instance, Blu- menbach has 5 races; Keane following Linnaeus, 4; Deniker, 29,5 The explanation probably is that 'the inumerable varieties of mankind run into one another by insensible degrees.'6 and to arrange them in sharply bounded divisions is an undertaking of such uncertainty that common agreement is practically impossible.
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may have been so changed by intermixture of blood as to justify an intermediate classification. Something very like this has actually taken place in India. Thus, in Hindustan and Berar there was such an intermixture of the 'Aryan' invader with the darkskinned Dravidian. 7

their racial purity,8 intermarriages did occur producing an intermingling of the two and destroying to a greater or less degree the purity of the <u>Aryan' blood.</u> The rules of caste, while calculated to prevent this intermixture, seem not to have been entirely In the Punjab and Rajputana, while the invaders seem to have met with more success in the effort to preserve [261 U.S. 204, 213] successful. 9

It does not seem necessary to pursue the matter of scientific classification further. We are unable to agree with the District Court, or with other lower federal courts, in the conclusion that a native Hindu is eligible for naturalization under section 2169. The words of familiar speech, which were used by the original framers of the law, were intended to include only the type of man whence they and their forebears had come. When they extended the privilege of American citizenship to 'any alien being a free matively in mind. The succeeding years brought immigrants from Eastern, Southern and Middle Europe, among them the Slavs already here and readily amalgamated with them. It was the descendants of these, and [261 U.S. 204, 214] other immigrants of like origin, who constituted the white population of the country when section 2169, re-enacting the naturalization test of 1790, whom they knew as white. The immigration of that day was almost exclusively from the British Isles and Northwestern Europe white person' it was these immigrants-bone of their bone and flesh of their flesh-and their kind whom they must have had affirand the dark-eyed, swarthy people of Alpine and Mediterranean stock, and these were received as unquestionably akin to those was adopted, and, there is no reason to doubt, with like intent and meaning.

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bates in Congress, during the consideration of the subject in 1870 and 1875, are persuasively of this character. In 1873, for example, the words 'free white persons' were unintentionally omitted from the compilation of the Revised Statutes. This omission was that the effect of their retention was to exclude Asiatics generally from citizenship. While what was said upon that occasion, to may well be left for final determination until the details have been more completely disclosed by the consideration of particular There is much in the origin and historic development of the statute to suggest that no Asiatic whatever was included. The desupplied in 1875 by the act to correct errors and supply omissions. 18 Stat. c. 80, p. 318. When this act was under consideration by be sure, furnishes no basis for judicial construction of the statute, it is, nevertheless, an important historic incident, which may Congress efforts were made to strike out the words quoted, and it was insisted upon the one hand and conceded upon the other not be altogether ignored in the search for the true meaning of words which are themselves historic. That question, however, and it is probably better to leave them as they are than to risk undue extension or undue limitation of their meaning by any What, if any, people of Primarily Asiatic stock come within the words of the section we do not deem it necessary now to decide cases, as they from time to time arise. The words of the statute, it must be conceded, do not readily yield to exact interpretation general paraphrase at this time.

understanding of the common man, synonymous with the word 'Caucasian' only as that [261 U.S. 204, 215] word is popularly understood. As so understood and used, whatever may be the speculations of the ethnologist, it does not include the body of What we now hold is that the words 'free white persons' are words of common speech, to be interpreted in accordance with the Common SPRECh

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as white. The children of English, French, German, Italian, Scandinavian, and other European parentage, quickly merge into the mass of our population and lose the distinctive hallmarks of their Buropean origin. On the other hand, it cannot be doubted ence, and it is of such character and extent that the great body of our people instinctively recognize it and reject the thought of people to whom the appellee belongs. It is a matter of familiar observation and knowledge that the physical group characteris-tics of the Hindus render them readily distinguishable from the various groups of persons in this country commonly recognized far from our thought to suggest the slightest question of racial superiority or inferiority. What we suggest is merely racial differthat the children born in this country of Hindu parents would retain indefinitely the clear evidence of their ancestry. It is very

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attitude of opposition to Asiatic immigration generally, but is persuasive of a similar attitude toward Asiatic naturalization as Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, 4289 1/4b), has now excluded from admission into this country all natives of Asia within designated limits of latitude and longitude, including the whole of India. This not only constitutes conclusive evidence of the congressional It is not without significance in this connection that Congress, by the Act of February 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 874, c. 29, 3 (Comp. St. 1918, well, since it is not likely that Congress would be willing to accept as citizens a class of persons whom it rejects as immigrants

It follows that a negative answer must be given to the first question, which disposes of the case and renders an answer to the second question unnecessary, and it will be so certified.

Answer to question No. I, No.

Footnotes


Footnote I] Dictionary of Races, supra, p. 31.

sion to a South Caueasian skull of specially typical proportions, and applied by him to the so- called white races, is still current, it brings into one race peoples such as the Arabs and Swedes, although these are scarcely less different than the Americans and Malays, who are set down as two distinct races. Again, two of the best marked varieties of mankind are the Australians and the Footnote 2] 2 Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th Ed.) p. 113: "The ill-chosen name of Caucasian, invented by Blumenbach in allu-3ushmen, neither of whom, however, seems to have a natural place in Blumenbach's series.'

Footnote 3] The United States Bureau of Immigration classifies all Pacific Islanders as belonging to the 'Mongolic grand division.' Cistionary of Races, supra, p. 102. Footnote 4] Keane himself says that the Caucasic division of the human family is 'in point of fact the most debatable field in the whole range of anthropological studies.' Man: Past and Present, p. 444 And again: 'Hence it seems to require a strong mental effort to sweep into a single category, however elastic, so many different peoples- Europeans, North Africans, West Asiatics, Iranians, and others all the way to the Indo-Gangetic plains and uplands, whose complexion presents every shade of color, except yellow, from white to the deepest brown or even black.

speaks to the eye that sees below the surface ... we recognize a common racial stamp in the facial expression, the structure of the hair, partly also the bodily proportions, in all of which points they agree more with each other than with the other main divisions. Even in the case of cer ain black or very dark races, such as the Bejas, Somali, and a few other Eastern Hamites, we are But they are grouped together in a single division, because their essential properties are one, ... their substantial uniformity reminded instinctively more of Europeans or Berbers than of thanks to their more regular features and brighter expression.' Id. 448.


[Footnote 9] I3 Encyclopedia Britannica, p. 503. 'In spite, however, of the artificial restrictions placed on the intermarrying of the castes, the mingling of the two races seems to have proceeded at a tolerably rapid rate. Indeed, the paucity of women of the Aryan stock would probably render these mixed unions almost a necessity from the very outset; and the vaunted purity of blood which the caste rules were calculated to perpetuate can scarcely have remained of more than a relative degree even in the case of the Brahman caste.' And see the observations of Keane (Man, Past and Present, p. 561) as to the doubtful origin and effect of caste. [Footnote 5] Dictionary of Races, supra, p. 6. See, generally, 2 Encyclopedia Britannica (11th Ed.) p. 113. [Footnote 7] 13 Encyclopedia Britannica (11th Ed.) p. 502. [Footnote 6] 2 Encyclopedia Britannica (11th Ed.) p. 113. [Footnote 8] Id. 448.



Fight The interfact but it must study the common understanding that the racial characterictics are now the arms, or studies mention, particip the interpretense of the statute wording of common speech (in the wording of common speech (in the source) statute statute wording of common speech (in the statute) statute wording of common speech (in the statute) statute, and the interpretense of the statute wording of common speech (in the statute) statute wording of common speech (in the statute) statute wording of common speech (in the statute) statute). The word of familiar gueb person, if was attutey of many three needs to privide only the type of many when they are availy provide the privide only the type of many when they are availy possible and their bind at a many or state availy possible of Alpha and Meditermatean stock, and these were technole at more available and their bind was adopted at the materian state of the state and the state and their bind and their b		1/20			61.	+50746	R		
TODWO TAT	research, but it must satisfy the common understanding that the racial characteristics are now the same, or sufficiently so to justify the interpreters of the statute written in the words of common speech for common understanding by unscientific men in classifying such persons together in the statutory category as white persons. United States w Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 209, 43 S. Ct 338, 67 L Ed. 616. In defining the type of person eligible to citizenship, the court uses this language: $TH \parallel N D$	"The words of familiar speech, which were used by the original framers of the law, were intended to include only the type of man whom they knew as white. The immigration of that day was almost exclusively from the British Isles and Northwestern Europe, whence they and their forbears had come. When they extended the privilege of American citizenship to `any alien, being a free white person,' it was these immigrants bone of their bone and flesh of their flesh and their kind whom they must have had affirmatively in mind. The succeeding years brought immigrants from Eastern, Southern, and Middle Europe, among them the Slavs and the dark-eyed, swarthy people of Alpine and Mediterranean stock, and these were received as unquestionably akin to those already here and readily amalgamated with them. It was the descendants of these, and other immigrants of like origin, who constituted the white population of the country when section 2169, re-enacting the naturalization test of 1790, was adopted: and there is no reason to doubt, with like intent and meaning."	It was not deemed necessary in the Thind Case to decide what, if any, people of primary Asiatic stock came within the words of the section. The thought of the court, speaking generally, is that each individual case must be determined upon its own peculiar. *920 characteristics, to be gathered in terms of the language of common understanding in the realm at the time of the adoption of the statute.	That the Armenians are of the Alpine stock can scarcely be doubted. The earliest authorities so classify them, as well as those coming later. Herodotus, book 7, c. 73 (Rawlinson's Translation [3d Ed.] vol. 4, p. 67), classifies them as Phrygians, but during their abode in Europe they bore the name of Brigians.	According to Strabo, book XI, § 14, there exists a sort of relationship between the Medes and the Armenians on the one hand, and the Thessalians on the other. Strabo lived about the middle of the first century B. C.	D. C. Brinton, in his work on Races and Peoples, p. 167, says: "Its latest contingent, the Armenian people, was a branch of the Thracian Briges and occupied their territory in <u>Asia Mi</u> nor about 700 B. C."		W. Z. Ripley, in Races of Europe, p. 448, referring to Von Luschan as most competent authority, declares: "The continuity of the Alpine race across Asia Minor cannot be doubted."	The witness Roland Burrage Dixon says of Von Luschan that he "was one of the outstanding anthropologists of Germany, who
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cally synonymous; at least such is the case in current usage. He further affirms that the Armenians readily assimilate with the the proposition that Armenians are white persons<u>, and th</u>at Caucasian and European, as used in common speech, are practipeople of France, Germany, and Russia.


+ Assimilation

American = white Armenians." He testifies: "I never have heard it suggested that they [the Armenians] were not white. In all the conversations with Americans and foreigners, we have always regarded them as white. • • • There were occasionally colored people came <u>thro</u>ugh the country, but they were always marked as completely distinguishable from the Armenians, who were never referred to in any way except as white, never thought of in any other terms than white persons." When asked, "As the terms 'white' and 'white are of the Alpine class of whites." The witness further affirms that they readily assimilate with the Europeans and the people of Dr. Barton is foreign secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. He established his home at Harpoot in September, 1885, and remained there until the summer of 1892, when he returned to this country. In 1919 he went again, as the head of the relief expedition under the Near East relief, into Turkey and Armenia, where he carried on relief work. During his early work in his mission field, he prepared an article for the Encyclopedia of Missions, on the subject of "Armenia and the persons' are commonly and <u>popularly used in the United States and Canada</u> and Europe, would you class the Armenians in your opinion as `white persons'?" he answered, **'I** surely would." Later he says, **'i**t is generally considered that they [the Armenians] his country. Within his own information, he knows of ten or fifteen Armenians in Boston who have married American wives.

Dr. Boas affirms, after reference to many authorities on anthropology and ethnology, that "it would be utterly impossible to classify them [Armenians] as not belonging to the white race."

tics respecting his own race in the United States. He shows that, according to the census of 1920, there were then foreign-born Armenians in the United States, 37,647; native white persons, both parents <u>Armenian</u>, 14,047; native white persons, one parent ized to be 10,574. He also gives a table as a result of special inquiry made of 339 persons; the object being to ascertain the extent of intermarriage among the Armenians, which discloses that of the number, 257 were married 125 to Armenian girls, and 132 to native white Americans, or, in a few instances, girls of Irish, German, Swiss, or French parentage. True, this information was gathered through means of questionnaires sent out by witness, but he states that he has personal acquaintance with by far the M. Vartan Malcolm, who was born in <u>Sivas, Ar</u>menia, has been <u>naturalized</u> in this country, is an attorney of standing in New York City, and has written a work on the Armenians in America, was a witness in the case at bar. He has gathered many statis-Armenian and the other not, 1,146 making a total of 52,840. From the same census, he finds the number of Armenians natural arger proportion of the persons of whom such inquiry was made.

100,000 marriage certificates issued by the clerk of the city of New York, from which it is deduced that for the first generation of immigrants the intermarriage rate is 10.4 per cent. "That," says the witness, "means that 10 per cent. of the first generation of "922 immigrants marry people not belonging to their nationality. ••• Now the rate for Armenians is practically the same as the Prof. Boas cites a work of Julius Drachsler, entitled "Intermarriage in New York City," compiled by the examination of about average rate. It is 9.63,






Archive of Racial Prerequisite Cases

Since the first Immigration Act of 1790 the privilege of citizenship was limited to "free white aliens." This jargon was not taken out of immigration law until 1952, when race was no longer formally named as a qualifier for obtaining citizenship. In 52 accounts, persons whose applications for naturalization were rejected on account of the racial prerequisite sued for their applications to be reconsidered. In their court cases they attempted to argue for and perform their whiteness in order to be considered eligible for naturalization. Through this process, the legal category of "white" was shifted and refined in order to specifically include some and exclude others. The following pages compile brief summaries of every recorded racial prerequisite case and its outcome.





Yup 1878, California

In re Ah Yup, Ah Yup, a person of Chinese descent, argued for why persons of Chinese descent are white persons. A federal court in California dismissed this contention with reference to then-current scientific and popular ideas about race, emphasizing that "Orientals" were unfit for participation in republican government because of the unsatisfactory political culture which existed in Asia at the time. The court determined that Ah Yup was not eligible for naturalization and persons of Chinese descent were not white persons.

Nian 1889, Utah

In re Kanaka Nian, the court found Kanaka Nian ineligible for naturalization in part on evidence that "it does not appear to the satisfaction of the court that the applicant understands the principles of government of the United States or its institutions sufficiently to become a citizen." The Utah Supreme Court based its decision on evidence that the petitioner could not read the U.S. Constitution in English (although he testified to having read it in translation) and could not name the U.S. president at the time (259; 6 Utah 259 [1889]). Claiming that "the man entrusted with the high, difficult, and sacred duties of an American citizen should be informed and enlightened [and] ... should possess a feeling of moral obligation sufficient to cause him to adopt the right," the Utah Supreme Court thus established moral and literacy parameters for naturalized American citizens, and by extension of "white persons," which the petitioner was found unable to meet.

Chang 1890, California

Hong Yen Chang was reportedly the first Chinese immigrant licensed to practice law in the United States. Soon after his admission to the New York State Bar, Hong Yen Chang moved to California and sought admission to the California State Bar. His motion to practice law in California reached the California Supreme Court in 1890. In support of his eligibility to practice law in California, Hong Yen Chang submitted his license to practice law in New York and "a certificate of naturalization, issued by the court of common pleas of the city of New York, November II, 1887." The California Supreme Court denied his motion to practice law in California, finding the naturalization certificate issued by New York invalid under the Chinese Exclusion Act.

Po 1894, New York

In *re Po*, Po, a person of Burmese descent, was found to be ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Common Knowledge and Legal Precedent to determine that persons of Burmese descent are not white persons.

Saito 1894, Massachusetts

In *re Saito*, Saito, a person of Japanese descent, was found to be ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Congressional Intent, Common Knowledge, Scientific Evidence, and Legal Precedent to determine that persons of Japanese descent are not white persons.

Hop 1895, California

In *re Gee Hop*, Gee Hop, a person of Chinese descent, was found to be ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Congressional Intent and Legal Precedent to determine that persons of Chinese descent are not white persons.

Rodriguez 1897, Texas

In his testimony before the court, Ricardo Rodríguez acknowledged that his interest in becoming a citizen lay in his long residency in Texas. He claimed that he considered his cultural heritage to be "pure-blooded Mexican" but that he was a descendant neither of any of the aboriginal peoples of Mexico, nor of the Spaniards, nor of Africans. He also swore that he was not acquainted with the form of government in the United States. These latter two issues were critical, since they raised the questions of racial and educational qualifications for achieving citizenship. Judge Maxey pointed out that the Constitution of the Republic of Texas granted citizenship to Mexicans living in the republic on Independence Day, and that the congressional resolutions in 1845 had further extended citizenship to Mexicans after annexation. In addition, he recalled that Article VIII of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo allowed for the conferral of American citizenship on Mexicans who continued to live in the territory after the Mexican War if they failed to declare their desire to become Mexican citizens. Judge Maxey declared that the Fourteenth Amendment granted citizenship to all people born or naturalized in the United States, regardless of color or race.

Burton 1900, Alabama

In *re Burton*, Burton, a person of Native American descent, was found ineligible for naturalization. There was no explanation found for the court's rationale regarding its decision that Native Americans are not white persons.

Yamashita 1902, Washington

In *re Yamashita*, Yamashita, a person of Japanese descent, was found ineligible for naturalization based on the rationale that "A native of Japan is not a 'white person' or an 'alien of African nativity or of African descent' within the meaning of Rev. Stat. U. S., Sec. 2169 (U.S. Comp St 1901, p. 1333), and therefore not entitled to become a citizen of the United States by naturalization."

Kumagai 1908, Washington

In *re Buntaro Kumagai*, Buntaro Kumagai, a person of Japanese descent, was found ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Legal Precedent and Congressional Intent to determine that persons of Japanese descent are not white persons.

Knight 1909, New York

In *re Knight*, Knight, a person of Japanese, Chinese, and European descent, was found to be ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Legal Precedent to determine that persons of Japanese, Chinese, and European descent are not white persons.

Balsara 1909, New York

In *re Balsara*, Balsara, a person of Asian Indian descent, was found ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Congressional Intent to determine that persons of Asian Indian descent are *probably* not white persons.

Najour 1909, Georgia

In *re Najour*, Najour, a person of Syrian descent, successfully argued for his right to naturalize by proving he was a "white person." The judge relied on the rationale of Scientific Evidence to make the ruling. Judge Newman deemed that whiteness does not depend on skin color, rather it is based in the "racial science" of the time.

Halladjiian 1909, Massachusetts

In *re Halladjiian*, Halladjiian, a person of Armenian descent, was found eligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Scientific Evidence and Legal Precedent to determine that persons of Armenian descent are white persons.

Dolla 1910, Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

In United States v. Dolla, Dolla, a person of South Asian descent, was granted citizenship primarily on the ground that the "skin of his arm" was "sufficiently transparent for the blue color of the veins to show very clearly" (177 F. 101, 102, 5th Cir. 1910). The court used the rationale of ocular inspection of skin to determine that Dolla is a white person.

Mudarri 1910, Massachusetts

In *re Mudarri*, Mudarri, a person of Syrian descent, was found to be eligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Scientific Evidence and Legal Precedent to determine that Syrians are white persons.

Bessho 1910, Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

In Bessho v. United States, Bessho, a person of Japanese descent, was found ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Congressional Intent to determine that persons of Japanese descent are not white persons.

Ellis 1910, Oregon

In *re Ellis*, Ellis, a person of Syrian descent, was found to be eligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Congressional Intent and Common Knowledge to determine that persons of Syrian descent are white persons.

Balsara 1910, Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

In United States v. Balsara, Balsara, a person of Asian Indian descent was found to be eligible for naturalization. The court relied on the rationale of Scientific Evidence and Congressional Intent to determine that persons of Asian Indian descent are white persons.

Alverto 1912, Pennsylvania

In *reAlverto*, Alverto, a person of European and Filipino descent, was found to be ineligible for naturalization. The court relied on the rationale of Legal Precedent and Congressional Intent to determine that persons of mixed European and Filipino descent are not white persons.

Young 1912, Washington

In *re Young*, Young, a person of German and Japanese descent, was found to be ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Legal Precedent to determine that persons of German and Japanese descent are not white persons.

Young 1912, Washington

In *re Young*, Young, a person of German and Japanese descent, was found to be ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Legal Precedent and Common Knowledge to determine that persons of German and Japanese descent are not white persons.

Shahid 1913, South Carolina

In *Ex parte Shahid*, Shahid, a person of Syrian descent, was found ineligible for natrualization. The court used the rationale of Common Knowledge to determine that persons of Syrian descent are not white persons.

Mozumdar 1913, Washington

In *re Akhay Kumar Mozumdar*, Akhay Kumar Mozumdar, a person of Asian Indian descent, was found ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Legal Precedent to determine that persons of Asian Indian descent are not white persons.

Dow 1914, South Carolina

In *Ex parte Dow,* George Dow, a person of Syrian descent, was found ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Common Knowledge to determine that persons of Syrians descent are not white persons.

Dow 1914, South Carolina

In *re Dow*, George Dow, a person of Syrian descent, was found ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Common Knowledge and Congressional Intent to determine that persons of Syrians descent are not white persons.

Dow 1915, Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

In Dow v. United States, George Dow, a person of Syrian descent, appealed two lower court decisions denying his application for naturalization as a United States citizen. Following the lower court decisions in *Ex Parte Dow* (1914) and *In re Dow* (1914), *Dow* v. United States resulted in the Circut Court's affirmation of the petitioner's right to naturalize based, in the words of Circuit Judge Woods, on "the generally received opinion . . . that the inhabitants of a portion of Asia, including Syria, [are] to be classed as white persons."

Lampitoe 1916, New York

In *re Lampitoe*, Lampitoe, a person of Filipino and European descent, was found ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Legal Precedent to determine that persons of European and Filipino descent are not white persons.

Mallari 1916, Massachusetts

In *re Mallari*, Mallari, a person of Filipino descent, was found ineligible for naturalization. There is no rationale listed for the court's decision in finding that persons of Filipino descent are not white persons.

Rallos 1917, New York

In *re Rallos*, Rallos, a person of Filipino descent, was found ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Legal Precedent to determine that persons of Filipino descent are not white persons.

Singh 1917, Pennsylvania

In Sadar Bhagwab Singh, Sadar Bhagwab Singh, a person of Asian Indian descent, was found ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Common Knowledge and Congressional Intent to determine that persons of Asian Indian descent are not white persons.

Singh 1919, California

In *re Mohan Singh*, Mohan Singh, a person of Asian Indian descent, was found eligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Scientific Evidence and Legal Precedent to determine that persons of Asian Indian descent are white persons.

Thind 1920, Oregon

In *re Thind*, Bhagat Singh Thind, a person of Asian Indian descent was found eligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Legal Precedent to determine that persons of Asian Indian descent are white persons.

Charr 1921, Missouri

In re Petition of Easurk Emsen Charr, Easurk Emsen Charr, a person of Korean descent, was found ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Common Knowledge and Legal Precedent to determine that persons of Korean descent are not white persons.

Ozawa 1922, Supreme Court

In Ozawa v. United States, Takao Ozawa, a person of Japanese descent, who was born in Japan but had lived in the United States for 20 years, was found ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Legal Precedent, Congressional Intent, Common Knowledge, and Scientific Evidence to determine that persons of Japanese descent are not white persons.

Thind 1923, Supreme Court

In United States v. Thind, Bhagat Singh Thind, a person of Indian Sikh descent, was found to be ineligible for naturalization. The court rejected his argument, holding that while Hindispeaking, high-caste Indians were indeed akin to white European peoples, they had intermarried too freely with the non-white pre-Indo-European people of India. Because of the uncertainty this caused for scientific classification, the court decided to use a "common sense" definition of "white" that did not allow for the "scientific arguments" Thind made, and did not classify people of Indian descent as white persons.

Sato 1923, California

In Sato v. Hall, Sato, a person of Japanese descent who served in the United States Army in the World War, was found to be ineligible for naturalization. After being admitted to citizenship by the United States district court of the territory of Hawaii, he was issued a certificate of citizenship. When Sato attempted to use his certificate of citizenship to vote, the clerk declined to cooperate, claiming Sato was not entitled to citizenship because of the racial prerequisite. The court used the rationale of Legal Precedent to determine that persons of Japanese descent are not entitled to naturalization by reason of service in the United States Army in the World War under subdivision 7 of section 4 of the act of Congress of May 9, 1918, which provides that 'any alien' who served in the army or navy during such war is entitled to naturalization.'

Mozumdar 1923, California

In United States v. Akhay Kumar Mozumdar, Akhay Kumar Mozumdar, a person of Asian Indian descent, was found to be ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Legal Precedent to determine that persons of Asian Indian descent are not white persons.

Cartozian 1925, Oregon

In United States v. Cartozian, Tatos Catozian, a person of Armenian descent, was found to be eligible for naturalization. In this case, Judge Wolverton stated that skin color was not a practical litmus test for ascertaining citizenship eligibility, but resolved that "it may be confidently affirmed" that Armenians are white persons. He based his conclusion, in part, on the belief that Armenians "readily amalgamate with the European and white races." The court relied on the rationale of Scientific Evidence, Common Knowledge, and Legal Precedent to determine that persons of Armenian descent are white persons.

Ali 1923, Michigan

In *United States v. Ali*, Ali, a person of Punjabi descent, was found ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Common Knowledge to determine that persons of Punjabi descent, "whether Hindu or Arabian," are not white persons.

Fisher 1927, California

In *re Fisher*, Fisher, a person of Chinese and European descent, was found to be ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Legal Precedent to determine that persons of Chinese and European descent are not white persons.

Javier 1927, District of Columbia

In *United States v. Javier*, Javier, a person of Filipino descent, was found to be ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Legal Precedent to determine that persons of Filipino descent are not white persons.

Din 1928, California

In *re Feroz Din*, Feroz Din, a person of Afghani descent, was found ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Common Knowledge to determine that persons of Afghani descent are not white persons.

Gokhale 1928, Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

In United States v. Gokhale, Gokhale, a person of Asian Indian descent, was found ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Legal Precedent to determine that persons of Asian Indian descent are not white persons.

Ysla 1935, Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

In *re De La Ysla v. United States*, De La Ysla, a person of Filipino descent, was found ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rational of Legal Precedent to determine that persons of Filipino descent are not white persons.

Cruz 1938, New York

In *re Cruz*, Cruz, a person of Native American and African descent, was found ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Legal Precedent to determine that persons of Native American and African descent are not "African."

Wadia 1939, Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

In *Wadia v. United States*, Wadia, a person of Asian Indian descent, was found ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Common Knowledge to determine that persons of Asian Indian descent are not white persons.

Cano 1941, Washington

In *De Cano v. State*, De Cano, a person of Filipino descent, was found ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Legal Precedent to determine that persons of Filipino descent are not white persons.

Samras 1942, Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit


In Kharaiti Ram Samras v. United States, Kharaiti Ram Samras, a person of Asian Indian descent, was found ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Legal Precedent to determine that persons of Asian Indian descent are not white persons.

Hassan 1942, Michigan

In *re Ahmed Hassan*, Ahmed Hassan, a person of "Arabian" descent, was found ineligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Common Knowledge and Legal Precedent to determine that persons of "Arabian" descent are not white persons.

Mohriez 1944, Massachusetts

In *Ex parte Mohriez*, Mohriez, a person of "Arabian" descent, was found eligible for naturalization. The court used the rationale of Common Knowledge and Legal Precedent to determine that persons of "Arabian" descent are white persons.



Naturalization & Immigration Acts


The following pages feature three significant laws on naturalization and immigration in the United States: The Naturalization Act of 1790, The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, and The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.

The Naturalization Act of 1790 was the first set of rules on who was eligible to become a naturalized American citizen. It limited eligibility to those who were considered to be "free white persons of good character." With this phrase, the law excluded Native Americans, indentured servants, slaves, African Americans, and later, any other immigrants to the United States of ethnicities not defined as "white," such as Asian immigrants.

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, also known as the McCarran-Walter Act, abolished racial restrictions to naturalization that went back to the Naturalization Act of 1790. However, it kept a quota system for nationalities and regions, which eventually created a prejudicial preference system that decided which ethnic groups and nationalities were the most desirable immigrants. Ultimately, the bill enacted much more restrictive rules on immigration in the United States.

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, also known as the Hart-Celler Act, abolished the National Origins Formula, thus legally removing discriminating limitations on immigration from non-northwestern European nationalities and ethnicities. The National Origins Formula, which was established with the Immigration Act of 1924, limited the number of immigrants from non-northern Europe in an effort to "preserve the ideal of American [Northwestern European] homogeneity." Through the efforts of the Civil Rights Movement, the National Origins Formula was attacked for being racially discriminatory. This Act ultimately increased the number of immigrants who came to the United States.





FIRST CONGRESS. SEM. II. CH. S. 1790.

lars; the marshal of the district of South Carolina, three hundred dollars; the marshal of the district of Georgia, two hundred and fifty dollars. And to obviate all doubts which may arise respecting the persons to be returned, and the manner of making returns,

SEC. 5. Be it enacted, That every person whose usual place of abode shall be in any family on the aforesaid first Monday in August next, shall be returned as of such family; and the name of every person, who shall be an inhabitant of any district, but without a settled place of residence, shall be inserted in the column of the aforesaid schedule, which is allotted for the heads of families, in that division where he or she shall be on the said first Monday in August next, and every person occasionally absent at the time of the enumeration, as helonging to that place in which he usually resides in the United States.

Szc. 6. And be it further enacted, That each and every person more than sixteen years of age, whether heads of families or not, belonging to any family within any division of a district made or established within the United States, shall be, and hereby is, obliged to render to such assistant of the division, a true account, if required, to the best of his or her knowledge, of all and every person belonging to such family respectively, according to the several descriptions aforesaid, on pain of forfeiting twenty dollars, to he sued for and recovered by such assistant, the one half for his own use, and the other half for the use of the United States.

SEC. 7. And be it further enacted, That each assistant shall, previous to making his return to the marshal, cause a correct copy, signed by himself, of the schedule, containing the number of inhabitants within his division, to be set up at two of the most public places within the same, there to remain for the inspection of all concerned; for each of which copies the said assistant shall be entitled to receive two dollars, provided proof of a copy of the schedule having been so set up and suffered to remain, shall be transmitted to the marshal, with the return of the number of persons; and in case any assistant shall fail to make such proof to the marshal, he shall forfeit the compensation by this act allowed him.

APPROVED, March 1, 1790.

OHAP. III. An Act to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.(s)

SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That any alien, being a free white person, who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for the term of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen thereof, on application to any com-mon law court of record, in any one of the states wherein he shall have resided for the term of one year at least, and making proof to the satisfaction of such court, that he is a person of good character, and taking the oath or affirmation prescribed by law, to support the constitution of the United States, which oath or affirmation such court shall administer; and the olerk of such court shall record such application, and the pro-

(a) This act was regarded by an act passed January 29, 1795, chap. 20. The acts refsting to naturalization subsequent to the act of March 28, 1790, have been: "An act to establish an uniform rele of naturalization, and to repeal the acts heretofore passed on that subject," January 29, 1795, chap. 20. Repealed April 14, 1802. An act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and to repeal the acts heretofore passed on the subject, passed April 14, 1802, chap. 28. An act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and to repeal the acts heretofore passed on the subject, passed April 14, 1802, chap. 28. An act in addition to an act entituled, "An act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and to repeal the acts heretofore passed on the subject," parsed March 28, 1804, chap. 47. An act relative to evidence in cases of unituralization, passed March 23, 1816, chap. 32. An act is further addition to "An set to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and to repeal the acts heretofore passed on the subject," passed March 23, 1816, chap. 32. An act is further addition to "An set to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and to repeal the acts heretofore passed on that subject," passed March 23, 1828, chap. 186. An act to amend the acts concerning naturalization, May 24, 1828, ch. 116. Act of July 30, 1813, ch. 36.

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STATUTE IL.

March 26, 1790.

Repealed - by Autor of January 29, 1795, ch. 20, Alien whites may become cit-izens, and how 19, and how.

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FIRST CONGRESS. SESS. II. Cn. 4. 1790.

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ceedings thereon; and thereupon such person shall be considered as a citizen of the United States. And the children of such persons so naturalized, dwelling within the United States, being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of such naturalization, shall also be considered as citizens of the United States. And the children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens: Provided, That the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the United States: Provided also, That no person heretofore proscribed by any state, shall be admitted a citizen as aforesaid, except by an act of the legislature of the state in which such person was proscribed.(a)

APPROVED, March 26, 1790.

STATUTE II.

March 28, 1790.

CHAP. IV. An Act making appropriations for the support of government for the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety.

Appropriations of monior of monies aris-ing from duties, for the civil list.

War department;

Pensions to invalide.

Incidental expeuses of Con-

SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there be appropriated for the service of the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety, to be paid out of the monies arising from the duties of imports and tonnage, the following sums, to wit: A sum not exceeding one hundred and forty-one thousand, four hundred and ninety-two dollars, and seventy three cents, for defraying the expenses of the civil list, as estimated by the Secretary of the Treasury, in the statement annexed to his report made to the House of Representatives on the ninth day of January last, including therein the contingencies of the several executive offices which are hereby authorized and granted; and also, a sum not exceeding one hundred and fifty-five thonsand, five hundred and thirty-seven dollars, and seventy-two cents, for defraying the expenses of the department of war; and the farther sum of ninety-six thousand, nine hundred and seventy-nine dollars, and seventy-two cents, for paying the pensions which may become due to the invalids, as estimated in the statements accompanying the aforesaid report.

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That all the expenses arising from, and incident to the sessions of Congress, which may happen in the course of the aforesaid year, agreeably to laws heretofore passed, shall be defrayed out of the monies arising from the aforesaid duties on imports and tonnage.

(6) The power of naturalization is exclusively in Congress. Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat, 259; 4 Coad. Rep. 111. A naturalized citizen, who in time of peace, returns to his native country for the purpose of trade, but with the intention of returning again to his adopted country, continuing in the former, a year after the war between the two countries, for the purpose of winding up his husiness, engrging in no new commer-cial transactions with the enemy, and then returning to his adopted country, has gained a domicil in his native country, and his goods are subject to coudemnation. The Frances, 8 Granch, 335; 3 Cond. Rep. 154 154.

154. The various acts on the subject of naturalization submit the decision upon the right of aliens to courts of record. They are to receive testimony; to compare it with the law; and to judge on both law and fact. If their judgment is entered on record in legal form, it closes all inquiry, and like other judgments, is complete evidence of its own validity. Spratt 2. Spratt, 4 Peters, 383. It need not appear by the record of naturalization, that all the requisites presented by law, for the ad-mission of allens to the rights of citizenship, have heen complied with. Starke v. The Chesapeake Ins. Comp. 7 Cranch, 420; 2 Cond. Rep. 556. A certificate by a competent court, that an alien has taken the oath preseribed by the act respecting naturalization, raises the presumption that the court was satisfied as to the moral character of the alien, and of his attachment to the principles of the constitution of the United States. The oath wheat taken, confers the rights of a citizen. It is not accessary that there should be an order of court admitting him to be a citizen. to be a citizen.

The children of persons duly naturalized before the 14th of April, 1802, being under age at the time of the maturalization of their parent, were, if dwelling in the United States on the 14th of April, 1802, to be considered as citizens of the United States. Campbell v. Gordon, 6 Cranch, 176; 2 Cond. Rep. 342. See also ex parts Newman, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 11; Peters' C. C. R. 487.

[United Elect., Radio, & Mach. Workers of Amer.]

SUMMARY - LEGISLADIVE HISTORY

WALTER-MCCARRAN IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1952

Public Law 414 - 66 Statute 163

The Walter-McCarran Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 is a joint product of Congressman Francis Walter (D. Pa.) and Senator Pat McCarran (D. Nev.), of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, and of course, of the House and Senate. The Bill was originally passed in the House under the sponsorship of Congressman Walters, the ranking Democrat on the Judiciary Committee. The House Judiciary Committee Chairman Emanuel Celler (D. N.Y.) strongly opposed the Walter Bill in his own Committee and introduced his own alternative Bill. It is important to recognize that the correct designation of the Act is Walter-McCarran Act and not the McCarran Act to avoid confusion with the McCarran Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.


1947, 1948, 1949	In 1947 the Senate adopted Resolution 137 authorizing study of Immigration and Naturalization Laws. This "study" continued through 1947, 1948 and 1949.	
1950	Senate Sub-Committee issued Senate Report 1515, a compre- hensive and detailed report on the Immigration and Naturalization system.	
April 20, 1950 & January 29, 1951	(S 3455) and its revision bill (S 716) introduced by Senator Pat McCarran (D. Nev.).	
February 5, 1951	(HR 2379) companion bill to McCarran's (S 716) introduced by Congressman Francis Walter (D. Pa.).	
March 6-21 & April 9, 1951	Joint hearings before the Sub-Committees of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees on (S 716, HR 2379 and HR 2186 /introduced Feb. 22, 1951 by Congressman Celler D. N.Y.7).	
August 27, 1951	(S 2055) a revision of (S 716) and (HR 2379) introduced by Senator McCarran (D. Nev.).	
October 9, 1951	(HR 5678) a substitute for (HR 2379) was introduced by Congressman Francis Walter (D. Pa.) referred to Judiciary Committee.	
January 29, 1952	(S 2550) introduced by Senator Pat McCarran (D. Nev.) and placed on the Senate calendar. (Senate Report 1137, Part I) (S 2550, revised S 2055 and was a companion bill to Walter's HR 5678).	
February 14,1952	(HR 5678) reported from House Committee without Amendment (House Report 1365).	
March 12, 1952	(S 2842) liberal substitute bill introduced by Senators Humphrey, Lehman and 12 other Senators.	
March 13, 1952	Minority report opposing McCarran Bill filed by Senators Kefauver, Kilgore, Langer and Magnuson (S Report 1137, Part II).	


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Apr. 23, 24, 25, 1952	(HR 5678) reported out of House Rules Committee and made a special order of business with 3 hours general debate and 5 minutes on each amendment permitted. (HR 5678) debated, amended, passed the House. A motion to re-commit was defeated on a non-roll call division vote with 62 to 195. Passed on a non-roll call division vote 206 to 68.
May 7-22, 1952	(S 2550) debated, amended and passed in the Senate on a voice vote.
June 9-10, 1952	Report of Joint Senate-House Conference Committee reported to House and passed on a non-roll call division vote 203 to 53, after a motion to re-commit was defeated on a voice vote.
June 11, 1952	Joint Senate-House Conference Report submitted to Senate and passed on a voice vote.
June 25, 1952	President Truman vetoed the Bill (House Document 520).
June 26, 1952	House overrides the veto by a vote of 278 to 113.
June 27, 1952	Senate overrides the veto by a vote of 57 to 26.

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Tools forLibrarians &Educators

The following pages feature a workshop plan that may be helpful for librarians or educators who are interested in using this resource book as an educational tool. This workshop, titled *Re-Imagining Citizenship*, has been used to facilitate discussions on citizenship as part of *Calling All Denizens* and includes a handout that may be replicated for educational uses. The other sections of this resource book may also be used as tools within the workshop plan.





Re-Imagining Citizenship: A Workshop

Overview:

Through reflection on the history of immigration and naturalization policy in the United States, this workshop will explore notions of "from within" and "from without" as they pertain to the nuances of citizenship, sovereignty, migration, exile, and diaspora. Using an artistic process, participants will reflect on their own experiences as they relate to the notions of belonging and community, in order to collaboratively build a shared vision of more compassionate, ethical, and genuinely liberated society that holds its denizens dear.

Objectives:

• Developing a deeper understanding of the history of immigration policy as it relates to the development of white supremacy in the social and legal fields in the United States.

- Developing a deeper understanding of participants' personal experiences and identities in the context of the history of the United States.
- Imagining futures, identities, and experiences beyond citizenship and nationality.
- Practicing cooperative-working skills, such as deep listening, communication, critical thinking, and sharing space.
- Building community, shared understanding, empathy, and respect amongst participants.

Materials:

- Big sheets of paper for shared exercises
- Individual sheets of paper
- Pens, pencils, markers, drawing and writing tools
- Books and references
- Magazines and other collage materials

Additional Notes:

- Please allow time for breaks as needed.
- This workshop was designed for groups of 10-15 people of ages 15 and older.
- This material is sensitive and has the potential to impact the emotional states of participants. Please be mindful of the group you gather together and work with an experienced facilitator.

Steps:

Group Introductions: 15-25 Minutes

- Facilitator introduces the project and goals of the workshop.
- Each participant shares their name, pronouns, and why they chose to participate.
- Facilitator proposes workshop structure to participants and asks for additional feedback.

Shared Rules of Engagement: 5-10 Minutes

• Facilitator explains the concept of shared rules of engagement and asks if any participant has done this before. If so, they may be able to help explain the process to others.

Facilitator asks participants to propose shared rules for the space, such as "Don't interrupt while others are speaking," "Ask neutral questions," etc.
Everytime a rule is suggested, the facilitator asks the entire group for

verbal consent. If everyone agrees, the rule is written up on a large and visible piece of paper in front of the group.

Group Discussion: Immigration & Naturalization Policy History: 20-30 Minutes
The facilitator passes out the handout on immigration policy and any other related materials.

• The facilitator shares a brief history of immigration policy in the United States in their own words. Allow participants to add in any information or ideas they want as you go through the materials.

• The facilitator asks participants: How does this history show up in today's rhetoric about immigration and citizenship? How does it relate to participants lived experiences?

• Please note that often, participants have personal anecdotes that may aid in understanding the history through a personal lens. The facilitator may encourage a group discussion to unfold.

Individual Activity: What is your relationship to citizenship?: 20-25 Minutes • The facilitator asks the group to personally reflect on their own experiences. The facilitator may ask, "What is your relationship to citizenship? Where do you get your sense of belonging and community? What does the notion of American citizenship mean to you? If citizenship could mean anything you want, what would it be?"

 Individuals may write, draw, collage, or individual express their reflection in other ways.

• The facilitator may remind the group that they will be invited to share their reflection if they want to.

Group Sharing: 15-25 Minutes

• Facilitator invites participants to share their reflections with the group. Please be respectful to those who do not want to share.

Allow for a group conversation.

Shared Manifesto: 25-35 Minutes

• The facilitator asks the group, "If we were to re-imagine and re-define the notion of citizenship, what would it look like?"

• The facilitator asks participants to propose ideas that relate to the personal experiences they shared.

• As participants share their responses, the facilitator asks the group if they agree. If everyone agrees, the facilitator may write the response on a visible large sheet of paper or board in front of the group.

• If the group does not agree, the facilitator may ask for revisions. If an

agreement cannot be made, save the item to come back to at the end.

• If you need to, you may translate these notes as a draft and share with participants for final edits at a later time.

• Facilitator shares final collaborative manifesto with all participants.

Closing: 10-15 Minutes

• Facilitator thanks the group for participating.

• Facilitator may ask the group if there's anything anyone wants to share as a closing.

• Share contact information between group members and leave the opportunity open to meet again.

A Brief History of Citizenship & Immigration Policy: Workshop Handout

Adapted from the introduction of Sentiments: Expressions of Cultural Passage.

Who is labeled an "immigrant" in the United States today? Mainstream media and politicians often imply that the identity of the "immigrant" is something simple and straightforward: An immigrant is a foreigner, a stranger, an outsider, the "Other." Relative to other geographic regions, the United States is new; many American citizens are at most only three or four generations removed from being "immigrants." Yet the social category as it is used today seems to imply that there is a deep difference between the immigrant of today and the immigrant of past generations. Someone is an immigrant not in virtue of where they've come from but in virtue of who they are. For many Americans today, "immigrant" seems to simply mean foreignness, where the quality of one's foreignness is (often) implicitly measured by one's proximity to whiteness-the less white someone is observed to be, the more of an "immigrant" they are. This contemporary conception, however, is a great oversimplification of a rich and complicated identity that intersects with a vast range of social categorizations such as race, nationality, culture, ethnicity, and so on. It is also a great oversimplification of American identity itself, as it implies that being American means being white. This is the same perspective that fuels practices of assimilation and that pressures immigrants to lean into whiteness in order to be accepted. This paradigm of "immigrant versus citizen" fuels one of the primary problems that the United States faces today and has faced throughout its history: an already-narrow, and narrowing, concept of what it means to be an American.

This characteristic of American citizenship was created by design, in order to strategically affirm a white supremacist hierarchy. Starting with the first Immigration Act of 1790, the privilege of citizenship was limited to "free white aliens."¹ This language aimed to transform northern and western European immigrants into American citizens and exclude anyone else. At the time it was first written into law, this language specifically excluded Black and Indigenous People from citizenship. This jargon was not taken out of immigration law until 1952, when race was no longer formally named as a qualifier for obtaining citizenship. However, it was not until 1965 that racist policies that limited the number of legally permitted immigrants who originated outside of northern and western Europe were actually revoked with the passing of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. This law was passed largely due to the momentum of the Civil Rights Movement that made white supremacy increasingly unacceptable in the social and legal spheres.² Although it was written into law, the term "free white alien" had come into legal use before the Supreme Court had fully, legally defined the category of "white person." As new waves of immigrants came

into the United States, various individuals across different time periods over the last 200 years who sought citizenship rights were strategically rejected on the basis of the racial pre-requisite. Through this process, the legal category of "white person" was refined and shifted.³ For example, in a famous Supreme Court case, United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind in 1923, Thind, an Indian immigrant, argued that he and American whites were both of Caucasian descent, and he was thus qualified to attain citizenship. In order to reject Thind's argument, the court decided to disregard its "scientific" understanding of what determines a "white person"-i.e. previously, the word "Caucasian" had been used to determine white status based on an individual's ancestry⁴-and used a new definition of whiteness "to be interpreted in accordance with the understanding of the common man."⁵ This shift not only explicitly shows that the production of laws in the United States is based on a social ideological notion of race, but also exemplifies the ways the legal system has fluctuated in order to maintain the ideology of whiteness. Instead of building up a deep cultural meaning around the idea of citizenship-as in trying to clarify what it means to be an accountable member of the public sphere, a neighbor, a resident, or a community member-the value of American citizenship was largely created through lines of race-based exclusion.⁶

Key Court Cases:

1. The United States V. Cartozian (1925)

In the United States Vs. Cartozian suit of 1925, Cartozian, an Armenian immigrant, argued for his status as a 'free white' with the hopes of attaining his American citizenship. At the time, the privilege of citizenship was only given to 'free whites;' however, the definition of 'white' was yet to be explicitly determined by law. Through this case and others, where non-western immigrants sought citizenship and attempted to argue away their differences using specific linguistic tactics in court (asserting their 'white' status), 'whiteness' was developed and refined as a distinct legal construct. For Cartozian, using the tactic of finding a common enemy, in this case Turkey, with the American white population, asserting his people's history of assimilation and amalgamation with other 'free whites,' among other tactics, allowed him the status of whiteness.

2. United States V. Bhagat Singh Thind (1923)

In 1923, the Supreme Court rejected citizenship for Bhagat Singh Thind, a high-caste Hindu applicant. The Court's reasoning for rejecting Thind marks a historic shift in the legal definition of whiteness from a "scientific," meaning a definition based on fixed geographic ancestry, to a "common sense" definition deemed by the logic of the "common man." Because Thind fit into the Court's 'scientific' definition of whiteness, they shifted the definition of 'white person' so as to exclude him from citizenship. Federal prosecutors were so affirmed by this decision, that they attempted to go after individuals who had already been naturalized, like Cartozian.

3. United States V. Takao Ozawa (1922)

In 1922, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected citizenship for a Japanese native who had resided in the United States for over 20 years. To quote the Court: "He [the applicant] was a graduate of the Berkeley, California, high school, had been nearly three years a student in the University of California, had educated his children in American schools, his family had attended American churches, and he had maintained the use of the English language in his home. That he was well qualified by character and education for citizenship is conceded." His citizenship application was rejected because, to quote the Court, "The intention was to confer the privilege of citizenship upon that class of persons whom the fathers knew as white, and to deny it to all who could not be so classified. … The appellant in the case now under consideration, however, is clearly of a race which is not Caucasian, and therefore belongs entirely outside the zone..."

¹ Between 1790 and 1802, people applying for naturalization were required to have resided in the country for five years, have "good moral character," and be "free white persons." This language was meant to exclude Black residents and "Indians not taxed" from citizenship rights. Generally, these laws aimed to transform northern and western European immigrants into American citizens and exclude anyone else. However, the Fourteenth Amendment declared that all free persons born in the United States should be considered citizens. In 1870, Congress amended naturalization requirements and extended eligibility to "aliens being free white persons, and to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent." This revision led to further confusion over racial eligibility for citizenship. In 1882, Congress banned the naturalization of Chinese immigrants with The Chinese Exclusion Act, however it did not explain whether "Chinese" indicated race or nationality.

² How the civil rights movement opened the door to immigrants of color by Rebekah Barber, Facing South, 2017.

³ White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race by Ian Haney Lopez, 1996.

⁴ Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 1922.

⁵ United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 1923.

⁶ Race, Nationality, and Reality by Marian L. Smith, 2002.

Credits & Thank Yous

Calling All Denizens is dedicated to Jackie & John Hanauer.

Calling All Denizens was published by Women's Studio Workshop in Rosendale, NY with funding from the New York State Council on the Arts with the support of Governor Andrew M. Cuomo and the New York State Legislature, the Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, the National Endowment for the Arts, and the Windgate Foundation.

The text in Calling All Denizens: Manifesto references and quotes the following:

• Page 6: Hugh of Saint Victor speaks of a man to whom the entire world is a foreign land, "The man who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire world is as a foreign land."

• Page 8: In Saidiya Hartman's talk at the University of California Los Angeles, hosted by the University's Gender Studies Department in March 2019, she framed her newest book, Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments: Intimate Histories of Social Upheaval, as a recognition of "those who love what is not meant to be loved."

• Page 10: In her book, Justice and the Politics of Difference, Iris Marion Young speaks of the importance of a politics of difference and the liberal veneer of "equality."

• Page 11: In Audre Lorde's, Poetry Is Not A Luxury, she speaks of the importance of being guided by emotional sensibilities.

• Page 13: In Aamir Mufti's Forget English! Orientalisms and World Literatures, he writes about nation-thinking, or the conception of society in national-cultural terms.

• Page 15: In Maya Angelou's poem, On The Pulse Of Morning, she writes, "The horizon leans forward, Offering you space to place new steps of change."

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